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This paper is concerned with the interactions of prices, costs, and rates
of growth; it is especially concerned with the cumulative effects of such
interactions. In view of the much-publicized recent difficulties of the
American railroads—with emphasis on those serving official territory—
it is still more particularly concerned with the possible dangers inherent
in cumulative decline.
Statistical Background
Freight transportation as a whole hasnotkept pace with the economy.
The decline of passenger travel by rail is too well known to require any
documentation. Moreover, passenger travel may often be noncom-
mercial in motivation asitis overwhelmingly noncommercial in
performance.So this presentation will confine itself to the most
favorable example in terms of both rail service and commerical
transportation generally.44 PRICING, COSTS, AND RATES OF GROWTH
The following table indicates that even intercity freight movements
have lagged behind the growth of the economy:
Index for 1962
1947 =100 1957 =100
Gross national product (1962 prices) 168.8 115.7
Industrial production 179.9 117.4
Intercity freight, 136.9 104.5
Excludes coastal andintercoastal shipping. Includesestimatedprivate carriage.
SOURCES:Gross national product and industrial production, from Economic
Report of the President, January 1963, pp. 172, 210;freight ton-miles, from
Testimony of A. E. Baylis, I.C.C. Docket No. 21989, Exhibit H- 23 in New York
Times, September 1, 1963, Section 4, p. 10.
Inclusion of coastwise ton-miles would not appreciably change the
freight indexes given above.If petroleum were excluded, coastwise
ton-miles would even show a strong downward trend.It is tempting
to blame the ton-mile record on the continuing decline of coal, but this
explanation would not justify an assumption of a reversal of trend in
the future. For traditional methods of transport are threatened from
all sides in the critical electric power market for coal:not only by
natural gas and coal pipelines, but also by higher and higher trans-
mission voltages for electricity, and more and more efficient nuclear
power plants. Therefore, it seems reasonable to predict that ton-miles
by traditional methods of transport will, at the very least, have trouble
holding their own against a changing economy and changing patterns
of fuel use within this economy.
This conclusion should require no proof. The further trend which
does require emphasis, for the purposes of this discussion, is the
tendency for an absolute decline in railroad ton-miles. These ton-miles
have never recovered their 1947 level; nor their 1956 level. Meanwhile,
truck ton-miles are about three times as great as they were in 1947, and
20—25 per cent above 1956. The relative shift from rail to truck has
not continued, during the last decade, at the pace set during the years
immediately after World War 11.But recent statistics do not indicate
that the decline in the railroads' relative share will be halted, or even
slowed enough to halt the absolute rail decline.
So much, then, for recent trends. But what was the economic position
of railroads during the era of greatest railroad expansion? Does an
examination of that period provide any clues to diagnosing theirPRICING, COSTS, AND RATES OF GROWTH 45
present problems? It will be specifically argued here that every con-
dition of differentiated oligopoly, of which railroading is surely an
example, is likely to be sui generis.The annalist, therefore, must
precede the analyst.
Dynamic Interdependence on a Rising Market
That useful compendium, Historical Statistics of the United States, is
full of surprises. Where else, for example, would one find depicted on
the cover a town which can only be Lexington, Massachusetts mis-
labeled Hannibal, Missouri? Where else would one learn that—in
apparent defiance of near-money, liquidity preference, and the pre-
cautionary and speculative motives—long-term interest rates in much
of the nineteenth century were actually below short-term interest rates?
And where else—to state the theme of this paper—would one discover
that, during the golden era of railroad expansion in the generation after
the Civil War, rates of return on the book value of railroad investment
were below rates of return on the most nearly risk-free securities?
The stated value of outstanding railroad securities more than doubled
between 1867 and 1870; more than doubled once again between 1870
and 1880; and almost doubled between 1880 and 1890. A doubling
in ten years requires growth at a rate of 7 per cent, compounded; yet
"net earnings" (a concept with a close affinity to "net operating
income") rose above 5 per cent only in the first two years for which such
earnings are reported: 1871 and 1872. As a percentage of stated value
of railroad securities, these earnings never recovered from the panic of
1873. They averaged just above 3 per cent per annum during the late
1880's.1 Interest on funded debt, which averaged just over 4 per cent
throughout the 1876—90 period, was more than double "dividends paid"
from 1885 on.2 In general, the impression conveyed by the statistics is
one of profitless prosperity carried to an extreme in both directions:
extreme prosperity, extremely profitless.
The basic point is not much changed if the argument is related to
"investment in railroad and equipment." This was not quite 10 per cent
less than the stated value of securities in 1876, and had declined slightly
in relative size to just under 14 per cent less by But neither the
small difference in percentage nor the even smaller difference in. trend
would affect the comparison to any meaningful degree.
1HistoricalAbstract, Series Q 33—42,p. 428.
2Ibid.
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It is tempting at this point to contradict the evidence of a rapid rate
of growth combined with a low rate of return by denying the accuracy
of the basic data. The financial antics of Jay Gould have thrown a
lurid light across this whole period. Before the days of stocks with no
par value, even the best-intentioned promoters must often have accepted
physical assets in exchange for stock at inflated nominal prices. A full
picture of this problem would require an endless sojourn among the
Valuation Dockets.Meanwhile, Professor Melville Ulmer estimates
that 21 per cent of the change in book value of railroad plant and
equipment between 1880 and 1890 was a product of write-ups of
assets.4Adjustment for these would raise the reported return on
investment, but it might not lower the nominal rate of growth.It
could even raise this nominal rate if the average write-ups in 1880
exceeded 21 per cent of recorded 1880 values.
Moreover, much railroad investment was not primarily intended to
yield profits from the operation of the railroad itself. The economic
history of the United States from independence to World War I could
be written, with a surprising approach to completeness, as a series of
variations on the theme of land speculation; and railroads were a
source of higher property values that even the most unenhightened
community fathers could appreciate.
Finally, railroads in the nineteenth century had an active, if not
creative, role to play in relation to corporate accounting. In various
ways, the railroad did more to create the accounting profession than
the accounting profession managed to achieve in restraining the
imagination of railroad entrepreneurs.But, if retirement accounting
offered wide scope for the movement of earnings backward and forward
through time, this same accounting tended to increase reported rates of
return in a growing industry over anything that could be achieved by
depreciation accounting.Holding asset values intact on the books
until assets were discarded tended to inflate net property accounts by
equating them with gross property accounts; but failure to depreciate
meant that annual charge-offs were a function of some much smaller
level of past assets rather than of the entire spectrum of assets in service.
All in all, if we indulge in qualitative guessing as a complement to
quantitative but dubious "facts," the net result would still not be a high
rate of return on assets used and useful in the public service: hardly
8 per cent; possibly 6 per cent; not impossibly even less than that.
Capitalin Transportation, Communications, and Pub/ic Utilities:Its Formation
and PrincetonUniversity Press for National BureauofEconomic
Research, 1960, Appendix J, Sources and Uses of Funds, p. 501.PRICING, COSTS, AND RATES OF GROWTH 47
This ability of a really major industry to raise very important sums
of money from all kinds of sources in the face of extreme uncertainties
can scarcely be explained in terms of persistent bullishness on the part
of investors. Twenty-five yearstoo long to be bullish, even during
the Gilded Age. Besides, a combination of world price trends and the
continued movement of the United States toward resumption of specie
payments produced a rapid and almost continuous decline of wholesale
prices from 1865 through 1879, and on down right through 1890. This
may help to explain a willingness to accept low immediate nominal
rates on long-term securities; but it does not help to explain why
liquid funds should rush to lock themselves up in a physical embodiment
with an unusually long life-cycle and in an industry subject to a rapid
rate of technical improvement.
So much for the various aspects of the problem. How may all of
these be combined to throw useful light on the period of fastest railroad
development in this country? This step requires a return to a familiar
static concept—that of differentiated oligopoly.This concept keeps
overflowing its economic box: sales expenses involve costs which in
turn affect the demand curve; a firm's market position at time (t)
will affect its policies and performance at time (t + 1), and so on.
But these problems are normally overlooked in order to put different-
iated oligopoly on the same logical plane as other forms of market
organization.The familiar oligopolistic pecularity—that of mutual
interdependence—is assumed to involve special uncertainties;but
these are often supposed to be most significant for pure oligopoly,
and to be amenable, in any case, to logical extensions of static analysis.
When differentiated oligopoly appears in industries with such heavily-
decreasing costs, and subject to so many internal and external influences
for dynamic change, as nineteenth-century railroading, the result is not
likely to be "mutual interdependence recognized" or an attempt to flee
the rigors of competition by carving a small private market out of
the larger general one.Instead, the result is likely to be a tendency
toward out-and-out monopoly. If entry is difficult—for such obvious
reasons as the gradual disappearance of public subsidies as local areas
either achieved their transportation ambitions or lost out in the
economic race because they had failed—then there must be some
advantage in buying up competitors. But the stick may be employed
along with, or prior to, the carrot: even if the competitor could not be
driven out, he could be demoted from trunk-line to local status,
deprived of other forms of economic importance and power, and bought
out or leased at a lower price commensurate with his weakened position.48 PRICING, COSTS, AND RATES OF GROWTH
This monopoly goal was never achieved over any really wide area—
with the possible exception of parts of the West Coast—during the
late nineteenth century, although E. H. Harriman frankly described this
as his objective early in the twentieth. But its interrelationship with
the dynamic factors already mentioned may go far to explain the
puzzling contrast of profits and expansion which has already been
described.
For the outright loser in the corporate race for position, the profit
record needs no explanation. This loser earned a low rate of return on
a specialized investment which could not easily be withdrawn from
the industry. Presumably the loser could not obtain capital for ex-
pansion.His fate was seldom abandonment, and often not even
absorption by more prosperous and powerful rivals.Whether tech-
nically independent or no, the loser was relegated to branch-line
status: low traffic density, low outlays for maintenance and capital
purposes generally;slow technical progress;a continued existence
more or less at the will of better-situated enterprises. This loser may
not even have been the proverbial "weak" road, so. dear to commen-
tators on the Transportation Act of 1920, or to expounders of the
justification for long- and short-haul discrimination.For "weak"
roads were generally assumed to be competitive with, or in some sense
comparable to, their stronger brethren. The losers we are discussing
were more nearly complementary than competitive.
For the outright winners, the profit record sometimes also needs no
explanation because it was high. The Pennsylvania and the New York
Central were the classic money-earners of the late nineteenth century,
and would have been even more outstanding if monopoly gains to
predecessor interests had not become imbedded in the structure of asset
valuations and leases of the successor concerns.But the New York
Central also illustrates the vulnerability to existing competition of even
a well-situated railroad.It also shows the particular vulnerability of
such a railroad to new entries before the railroad map became frozen,
due to the unwillingness of public interests to support new ventures.
First, Gould engaged the Central in savage rate wars, even with a
manifestly higher-cost property;Gould did not sellthe Erie to
Commodore Vanderbilt only because Vanderbilt thought he had bought
it.Gould cheerfully met Vanderbilt's common stock purchases by
conversion of debentures held in the Erie treasury, and thus kept
voting control of that unhappy enterprise. Second, the Nickel Plate
could not have been more of a threat to the Central if it had been
designed solely with that purpose in view—which was obviously thePRICING, COSTS, AND RATES OF GROWTH 49
opinion of the Vanderbilts, who bought it on behalf of the New York
Central immediately upon its completion. Third, the West Shore-South
Pennsylvania stand-off, although not explicable in terms of sheer
blackmail, contained elements of
Mirror, mirror on the wall—
Who is the fairest of them all?
Silvering the mirrors cost both the Central and the Pennsylvania a
great deal of money.
The great bulk of railroad mileage, and of railroad capital, fell in
between the "hopeless" low return and the high return, with more or
less dilution. Ask the question—what do the following railroads have
in common, aside from conspicuous relative profitability since World
War II:Chesapeake & Ohio and Norfolk & Western; Southern;
Santa Fe and Union Pacific? One answer would be that all were in
reorganization during the 1890's. As the subsequent record has proved,
these difficulties were not due to poor original choice of location, or
particularly bad luck in the development of the territory served. Most
were not due to bad management, or to speculative financing in the
sense that more conservative alternatives could have been chosen. A
very complex series of episodes in American transportation history may
perhaps be summarized as follows: with the possible exception of the
Union Pacific, all of the railroads listed above had seen that they would
drift back into the short-line group in Category 1 unless they built,
and bought, on a gigantic scale. A railroad which really started at
Atchison and ended at Santa Fe would have done very little.Instead,
roads like the Santa Fe, with particularly strong leadership, aimed at
the rank of the New York Central and Pennsylvania—which was a
long way from their unpretentious origins. These roads were able to
raise the funds required to aim at this rank because of the rapidly
expanding demand for the services of the industry.They were all
driven aground by a sharp downturn of the business cycle, but were
rapidly refloated on the incoming business tide at the turn of the century.
The preceding comments offer a highly schematic version of a most
"dynamic" stretch of transportation history. What analytical possi-
bilities emerge from this record?
1. Present profits may be subnormal in a rapidly expanding industry,
and not necessarily abnormal (in order to provide a flow of internal
funds and attract finance from outside).
2. The first step toward explaining the apparent paradox of sub-
normal returns in an abnormally expanding industry is to make the50 PRICING, COSTS, AND RATES OF GROWTH
paradox even sharper by noting that an abnormal rate of physical
expansion does not, in itself, furnish any promise of an abnormal rate
of growth, or an eventual abnormal level, of profits.
3. The missing link in the argument must be a condition of decreasing
costs on such a scale, for each firm, that aggressive tactics may be
expected both to drive present lower-density firms to the wall and to
act as a strong deterrent to entry—once the existing firms become able
to develop volume and density by growth of the market and both
parallel and end-to-end consolidation.
4. Such aggressive tactics were encouraged, in rail transportation, by
the fact that one element in differentiation consisted of building private
sidings to the premises of large shippers. Once these shippers became
established, and committed fixed investment to the services of one
railroad, this railroad could begin to earn abnormal returns without
any possibility of entry—as long as the shippers were not stimulated to
encourage entry by their own efforts (as Andrew Carnegie was stimulated
to support the South Pennsylvania project).
5. As the scale of the market expanded longitudinally (rail shipment
feasible for greater distances) as well as laterally (heavier density of rail
shipments to and from given areas), the range of possible competition
increased. The larger number of different routes for larger volumes
over longer distances also increased the actual and possible degree of
differentiation.This increase in the size of the available worlds to
conquer also enhanced the risk of being conquered: but here, as in
horse-racing, lengthening the odds possibly operated to reduce, or in
some cases perhaps to reverse, the risk premium.
6. A view of market prospects from both sides—prospects of gain,
and dangers of loss—indicates that new investment may have been
rational even with low average and marginal returns on existing
investment. The marginal productivity of new investment need not be
positive in a net sense (after allowance for depreciation, or retirement
and replacement, as the case may be) as long as it is positive in a gross
sense (increment to gross flow of cash discounted by a low current rate
possibly increasing with time, in excess of current cost of asset).In a
static model, this would seem to amount to a recommendation to
throw good money after bad. But the present case is not the profits
treadmill of a purely competitive industry, with stationary profits
possible only after unremitting effort. The profits prize might go not
only to the greatest amount of capital investment per unit of length or
area, but to the fastest rate of capital investment. Kalecki's "principle
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7. This capital investment could take three very distinctive forms,
yielding three dimensions of differentiation; intensive (higher capacity
per unit of length), extensive (including more units of length in a given
area already served), and qualitative (more efficient embodiments of
capital). The first yields familiar "decreasing cost" conditions. The
second involves every possibility, from an outward push on the
collective demand curve to sheer cancellation because of duplicate
effort. The third provides the most obvious relationship of differen-
tiation to "progress."
Both the first and third of these dimensions would make rate de-
creases possible directly;the second might make decreases possible
indirectly, by feeding increased volumes of traffic onto the "main line."
Inturn,ratescould be—and were—differentiated,customer-by-
customer, just as service was differentiated in typically larger units.
Price differentiation may permit larger sales for a given rate of profit;
which, in turn, may permit price reduction, further growth in volume,
and so on.
8. Even without competition from the internal combustion engine
after World War I, capital supply, "normal" rate of profit, and other
railroad problems might have been affected by a combination of
factors: more rigorous regulation; fewer additional gains to be made
at the expense of railroad competitors; and possibly a slower rate of
growth in "inherent" transportation demand, as the marginal physical
product of extensive development slowed down and further extensions
were not undertaken.
But these considerations are now leading us into the problems of
maturity.Is there a critical rate of growth—year-by-year, or cumu-
lative—below which internal repercussions begin to develop which slow
growth even further?
The Point of No Return
This titleisnecessarily metaphorical, since the "life cycle" of an
industry is not a precise concept.But, unless the industry should be
rejuvenated by a cluster of innovations or by other external influences,
it will reach a point in its aging process when the cumulative, interacting
forces making for growth will be overborne by retarding influences.
The simplest illustration of this concept is provided by the contrast
between the learning curve and the featherbed.
With age, every industry develops a staff of skilled laborers, sources
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for systematic education of its labor force, experienced suppliers of
equipment and raw materials, and all the other desirable by-products of
continued existence.Many of these by-products will retain their
importance even if the individual firms in the industry come and go.
The other side to this maturing process is the development of habit
patterns: howmuchcanbe done, howit should be done,who should doit,
under what working conditions, in the context of what kind of hierarchy
for enforcement of discipline and distribution of incomes, at what rates
of pay or rates of pay increase. These habit patterns involve a mixture
of the technical and the financial. In the extreme case, there may never
be any technical loss from freezing the job structure, enforcing seniority
rules, or prohibiting the introduction of new methods. But the "habit"
aspect of maturing will still have caught up with the growth aspect,
from the standpoint of this industry's competitive position in the
entire economy, if even a normal rate of technical improvement is
accompanied by a tendency for factor costs to rise at a faster rate than
the average for industries in general. Leads in factor prices will have
the same effect as lags in factor efficiencies on demand, and on the
mutual interrelationships of demand, cost, and price.
The aeronautical analogy of "stalling speed" could be used, i.e., a
rate of growth which, as it declines, adds power to the forces operating
to slow the industry rate of growth, and thereby helps prevent a return
to the previous rate of growth. But this concept is not truly independent.
The relevant rate of growth of demand would vary with the age of the
industry and hence the behavior of its costs.
The important questions, from the standpoint of this paper, are
those relating to trends and not turning-points. Therefore, this inter-
mediate stage will not be examined in detail, but it may be noted that
the point of no return may come sooner, rather than later, under the
following conditions.
1. It will come sooner if market dominance comes earlier. The high
demand elasticity of differentiated oligopoly combines with a profusion
of opportunities to shift the entire demand curve of the firm and capture
previously unexploited segments of the market. Additional differen-
tiation becomes pointless by definition once monopoly is reached, and
probably more or less pointless in fact at some intermediate stage.
Hence, there will be possibly less waste from duplicated facilities, but
probably also less need on the part of the dominant firm for technical
progress.Moreover, hope for a big new prize cannot attract new
capital at low current rates of return. The prize, big or small, has
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2. If regulation inhibits competition it can produce a facsimile of
market dominance, but without the security for investors that market
dominance provides.
3. It will come sooner if differentiation takes the form of near
duplication of facilities instead of innovation.
Beyond this point, generalizations tend to become a guessing game.
The next section will carry on the argument in more concrete terms.
Dynamic Interdependence on the Way Down
The essential problem here is the savage reprisals of the capital market
once an industry has disappointed its hopes.This may seem to
introduce a paper dragon, since the main problem of a declining
industry is to release embodied capital as rapidly and painlessly as
possible. But the realities are:
1. A downward shift in the demand for an industry's services may
increasetheneed for capital betterment to provide a cheaper or more
efficient service, at the same time as it decreases the flow of funds
available to meet the need;
2. Any going concern is caught in a web of contractual obligations
and "legitimate expectations." Interest payments, and even dividends,
tend to hold up longer than net operating income.Moreover, the
acquisition of new capital from private sources bumps up against the
historical fact of the existing capital structure. In the railroad industry,
various devices for financing rolling stock have built a temporary
detour around the balance sheet of each debtor railroad; but what is
to happen if the whole industry faces a declining demand and a heavy
outstanding debt in the form of equipment trusts and conditional sales
contracts?
3. The discontinuity between returns expected on internal and ex-
ternal "new money" may actually increase. A hardy perennial of
corporation finance is the proposition that new securities must sell at a
discount.But, as we have seen, this discount when applied to an
expanding industry may simply raise effective yields toward "normal
profit." In a declining industry, with equities already selling well below
book value, issuance of new stock at a discount from even this level
would not be easy to explain to stockholders. Meanwhile, internally
generated funds are dropping with the decline in sales, or much faster,
since the short-run inflexibility of costs tends to become even more
stubborn in an industry with long-run costs containing ingredients
which are also inflexible. As a result, the rate of discount applicable to54 PRICING, COSTS, AND RATES OF GROWTH
yields from better investment begins soaring;an industry whose
troubles may stem from low-quality investment thereupon says goodbye
to improvement.
4. Theoretically, "better" investment and "more" investment are
two entirely different things.In practice—and especially in transpor-
tation practice—it may be almost impossible to segregate the qualitative
from the quantitative.In so far as improvements are more capital-
intensive, they are likely to add to capacity, somewhere and in some
respect. A firm which must anticipate either a decline in physical use
of its facilities, or a decline in receipts per unit of use as the price of
continued utilization, may find itself facing two ways at once: toward
increased capacity, as a by-product of "improvement"; and toward a
decreased flow of internally generated earnings available to pay for this
capacity.
5. With technical progress slowed down just when it is most needed,
can or should the decline be arrested economically, or financially?
Before examining this dilemma, we must go further in establishing that
it really exists.Specifically, by any customary measure, the technical
progress of American railroads has been very considerable over the last
.twenty or thirty years. Is there any evidence of a vicious circle here—
especially for an industry with a century of technical progress already
behind it a generation ago?
It would be most ungracious to deride railroad technical achieve-
ments, especially when they are viewed against the background of the
industry's difficulties with finances, operating rules, regulatory bodies,
etc.This paragraph will merely suggest that the recent historical
record of technical progress in railroading may be used to prove too
much about the future. The diesel locomotive provided a very impor-
tant source of productivity gains before, and especially after, World War
II.This locomotive owed much of its success to the application of
certain of the principles of automobile manufacture: standardization
of production methods; standardization of product; and an approach
to mass production. Elsewhere in railroading, the product was already
more standardized—or more resistant to standardization. The peak
of the shift to diesels occurred at about the time of peak optimism about
prospects for rail tonnage and revenues: ergo, of peak marketability
for rail equipment obligations. Even today, improvements in equipment
are much more easily financed than improvements in way and structure;
and standard equipment is more easily financed than highly specialized
equipment which can be used in only one area or for a limited range of
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So the record of technical change in railroading should not lull us
into complacency about the future, especially since truck competition
has been most sharp on the small-volume, light-loading, short-haul
movements which were bound to depress railroad productivity indexes
as long as they were an important element in railroad service.
To return, then, to the economic and financial prospects, economically,
two possibilities exist:marginal cost pricing and intensified price
discrimination.
MARGINAL COST PRICING
Rigorously applied, this would have the advantage of eliminating
accumulated areas of internal subsidy.it would have the further
advantage of cushioning the downward shift of demand curves by
intersecting each one at a level of lower price and higher volume.
The disadvantages would all stem from financial difficulties. Bank-
ruptcy may not frighten an economist, but both the threat and the
actuality may sometimes galvanize corporate managements. The long
descent into bankruptcy is as demoralizing to employees as to stock-
holders. Bankruptcy is a temporary legal expedient appropriate to an
economy in which one firm, more or less, is assumed to make practically
no difference. The issue may lie between the former management and
the current creditors; or it may turn on the continuation or liquidation
of the firm itself. In a world of competitive firms, there is no economic
difference. But in a world of decreasing costs, differentiated oligopo-
lists, and long-run shifts in demand curves, marginal cost pricing under
private ownership might eventually produce a tag-end service provided
by the physical assets which cling to life most stubbornly. Assets with
high opportunity costs could be shifted elsewhere or into other uses;
assets with short life spans would have to be retired. Meanwhile, on
the way down, shifts in demand curves would be accelerated by service
deterioration affecting the form of transport whose popularity was
tending to wane even with previous service standards. And the dis-
Continuous character of the disinvestment process might plunge shippers
directly down from quite good service by each of the competing forms
of transport to no service at all by one or more of them.
INTENSIFIED PRICE DISCRIMINATION
One of the obvious drawbacks of the aging process in an industry is
the tendency to freeze yesterday's price structure in the face of today's
costs. If both marginal cost pricing and public subsidy are ruled out, a
decreasing cost firm is likely to increase its interest in price discrimi-
nation; and, if the demand curve for its services is shifting downward, it56 PRICING, COSTS, AND RATES OF GROWTH
must comb through its existing rate structure in search of opportunities
to maintain volume, or net earnings, or both.
In a stationary world, this is well and good. A declining business
should examine its demand structure as carefully as its cost structure—
and act promptly on any discoveries it makes.
But in a dynamic world, "too late" cancels out everything. The
high elasticity of demand which justifies a price cut may have been the
end product of a minor share of the market; this, in turn, may have been
the end-product of earlier price and service inflexibilities. All of which
may simply prove that the best way to regain business is not to lose it
in the first place.
Intensified price discrimination in the railroad industry faces two
real problems: (1) For a wide range of commodities, the controlling
rates are now truck rates; (2) trucking is a rapidly expanding industry
in which the relevant costs, for purposes of examining rates, are long-run
costs—of operation, of vehicles, of the highways themselves.
There is nothing wrong with intensified price discrimination in
principle; but, in practice, it may simply offer an excuse for locking
the barn door after the horse is stolen.
FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS
Financially, the problem is to find out whether an industry which has
always believed in charging what the traffic will bear can benefit from
yet another turn of the screw while external competition is steadily
growing. Even with constant volume, the firm may still be able to
check the downward spiral by massive rate readjustments which' align
the pricing structure to current cost of service. But this possibility of
realignment assumes both that the market is strong enough to yield
additional revenues and the regulatory authorities will permit a re-
adjustment which must be rapid and drastic to be effective.
This same financial result may be approximated, within limits, by a
realignment of service to gain more net revenue out of a frozen pattern
of rates. The service spectrum may, of course, be too narrow to yield
all the freedom available through rates themselves. The only feasible
way to vary service may be to abandon large portions of it—passen-
ger service, all service on certain lines—even at a cost of consider-
able decrease in volume of business, and possibly in volume remaining
per mile of residual system.
The preceding paragraphs have only sketched in possibilities. This
is partly due to the time dimension implicit in this section, which ex-
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the fact that regulatory policy is a much more important influence now
than it was in the era of greatest railroad growth (one purpose of this
paper is to abstract from regulation, per Se, to the utmost degree
compatible with some resemblance to reality). But it is mainly due to
a belief that the road downhill may end at a precipice. The possible
existence of this cut-off point, below which a downfall becomes a
disaster, is precisely the cause of deepest anxiety about public policy
for the industry.It is bad enough if decisions turn an orderly industry
retreat into a rout; it is surely much worse if these decisions drive, or
push, the industry to its own annihilation.
This kind of statement can be intensely irritating, because it intimates
that radical policy changes may be essential and yet offers no clue as to
the form these changes might take. But one thing, at least, can be said
without departing from the present context: decisions based on static
assumptions as to "most efficient," or "least cost," or "best service"
are likely to produce only puzzlement, as the industry continually
develops new symptoms which are not covered by the original diagnosis.
Specifically, "what is wrong with the railroads" from the standpoint of
public policy—either in themselves, or as they compete with other
media of transportation—may be due in part to the fact that both
regulation and promotion look too closely at past conditions and not
closely enough at the nature, meaning, future course, and destination,
of current trends.This backward-looking view may be inseparable
from regulation. If so, it is an argument against regulation as such.
Conclusion
Finally, this paper has not begun to live up to its title. The "trans-
portation" so broadly promised turns out to be railroads, and usually
just railroads hauling freight.At least something must be done to
restore the balance.
The technical origin of interdependence in the early days of rail-
roading was the existence of permanent way under the control of the
firm operating the facilities and offering final transportation services
to the consuming public. The permanent way was the outstanding
single source of decreasing costs.The vertical integration was the
outstanding source of the ability to carry elaborate forms of price
differentiation right through tofinal consumers.These technical
sources are not duplicated in any other major form of transportation.
Airlines and shipping obviously do not require permanent way. Trucks
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would be possible to have oligopolistic warfare between turnpike
authorities, but this possibility has been foreclosed, supposedly for all
time, by the institutional development of the highway "industry."
Conversely, modern methods of transport must adhere to schedules,
or operate within maximum time limits.Nothing could have been
farther from the freight practices of American railroads in the nine-
teenth century.Express lines sprang up, sOmetimes with railroad
sponsorship, but the shipper who did not want to pay a substantial
premium had to wait indefinitely to hear that the goods had arrived.
The necessity for scheduling also brings in the possibility of decreasing
costs with additional capital investment, as more units of service per
route or per firm may help to fill all units (better load factor) or to
permit each unit to serve for longer hours on the average (utilization
factor). In the infancy of the airlines, these could be very important
considerations; on routes with low traffic densities, they still are. But
this scheduling problem, at its worst, is not really identical with the
decreasing cost situation of the early railroads.Scheduling involves
load factors; and load factors bring in the possible relevance of joint
costs and of peak and off-peak use. These present thorny problems of
analysis and policy, but they are likely to have cumulative or dynamic
attributes only in the early stages of growth—or the last stages of
decline.
The future of the railroads may be foreshadowed with startling
clarity by the history of coastal shipping. As a general carrier of coastal
cargo, shipping is approaching a watery grave.This is true in spite
of the fact that practically all of the arguments for the superiority of
railroad efficiency to truck are also arguments for the superiority of
sea to land efficiency. The trouble obviously is a combination of high
terminal costs and slow and relatively unattractive service. Once the
decline is well under way, the hiatus between calls tends to lengthen;
the job of profitably operating any liner service tends to become more
difficult; and the stage is set for a further decline of the industry. In
view of present railroad problems, there may be at least some poetic
justice in the fact that the past decline of coastwise "liner service" was
hastened by aggressive pricing and service tactics on the part of the
railroads.
What does this discussion have to contribute to public policy?
1. An emphasis on the necessity for continuous exploration of future
solutions, on the basis of reasonable alternative hypotheses, and with
the aid of models which incorporate the interrelationships of demand,
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2. Possibly, also, an argument for de-emphasis of regulation under
just those conditions of industrial age and converging industrial problems
which seem to make regulation most secure and most necessary. For
age tends toward inflexibility, even in the absence of regulation. New
competition, from new quarters, may require greater flexibility if the
original service is to maintain itself. And regulation may therefore
weight the scales against flexibility just when this flexibility is most
required.
COMMENT
HOWARD W. NIcHoLsoN, Clark University
Nelson attempts to explain the large flows of private capital into the
American railroad system during the late 19th century, despite seem-
ingly subnormal returns. His paper is also concerned with the current
capital needs of railroads.Nelson stresses that, in the absence of
suitable demand conditions, railroads may experience difficulties in
obtaining adequate revenue for current capital requirements with either
marginal cost or discriminatory pricing policies. He seems skeptical
as to whether elasticity of demand is sufficiently high to effectively
contribute to capital needs through rate cutting.In the absence of
policies which will have the effect of shifting the demand curve for rail
transportation upward, Nelson expresses doubt that even the most
aggressive system of discriminatory pricing will enable the railroads
to obtain a supply of capital adequate to make full use of modern
technological possibilities.
Nelson's paper is specifically addressed to the relationship between
price and investment in transport facilities.But I regret that he
conceived of his problem so narrowly and that the ingenuity he demon-
strates in analyzing investment motives influencing private capital flows
into the rail system was not directed to analysis of basic determinants
of flows of capital into other significant areas of the transportation plant.
In short, 1 am criticizing his failure to provide the breadth of analysis,
the analytical framework against which to adequately judge the
pressing pricing policy issues of today. What are these issues? What is
this unmet challenge to price analysis?
In the 1870's, the Windom Committee reported that the transpor-
tatio.n problem of that day was unsatisfactory rail service and un-
satisfactory railroad rates. The Committee's report proposed that the
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waterways which would bring competitive pressures on the railroads
to reduce their rates and improve their service.This policy was not
immediately adopted.Instead, in 1887, Congress passed legislation
providing for regulation of railroad rates.Shortly after this, however,
the federal government began to promote competitors for the railroads,
beginning with waterways, then highways, and finally air transportation.
Today, national transportation policy is a mixture of the policies
recommended by the Windom and Cullom Committees in the 1870's
and 1880's. The Doyle Report provides evidence that present policies
are producing instabilities in the transport system.Existing policies
tend to produce large government investment in transport facilities,
creating a chronic tendency toward a total supply of transport facilities
in excess of the demand which exists for transport service.More
serious may be the tendency of present policies to produce an imbalance
in the mix of transport facilities.This, in essence, is the railroad
problem. Moreover, there is evidence that pricing and other aspects of
present policy discourage efficient utilization of existing transport
facilities and do not tend to promote the best quality of service.
The fundamental question for pricing policy is whether, by suitable
changes, a pricing system can be developed which will help to correct
imbalances in transportation investment while encouraging a more
rational utilization of existing facilities, lower cost and better quality
service. The emphasis which the Doyle Report places on cost-related
pricing is designed to emphasize the need for development of trans-
portation policies which will produce rates that contribute to develop-
ment of a more efficient and better coordinated transportation system.
This involves a consideration of the effect of rate policies on investment,
on use of existing facilities, and on the cost and quality of service
produced by the existing system.
The challenge for transportation economists is to clarify understand-
ing of how alternative price policies will affect all of these vital areas.
We need to know much more than we do about what these effects are,
and we need to be able to evaluate specifically the implications of
different pricing policies both for use patterns of existing facilities and
for transportation investment.